The valuation effects of investor attention in stock-financed acquisitions by Adra, Samer & Barbopoulos, Leonidas
 
 
University of Birmingham
The valuation effects of investor attention in stock-
financed acquisitions
Adra, Samer; Barbopoulos, Leonidas
DOI:
10.1016/j.jempfin.2017.10.001
License:
Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND)
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Adra, S & Barbopoulos, L 2018, 'The valuation effects of investor attention in stock-financed acquisitions',
Journal of Empirical Finance, vol. 45, pp. 108-125. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2017.10.001
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2017.10.001
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
Accepted Manuscript
The valuation effects of investor attention in stock-financed acquisitions
Samer Adra, Leonidas G. Barbopoulos
PII: S0927-5398(17)30089-0
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2017.10.001
Reference: EMPFIN 1006
To appear in: Journal of Empirical Finance
Received date : 22 November 2016
Revised date : 3 October 2017
Accepted date : 9 October 2017
Please cite this article as: Adra S., Barbopoulos L.G., The valuation effects of investor attention in
stock-financed acquisitions. Journal of Empirical Finance (2017),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2017.10.001
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to
our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo
copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form.
Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the
content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
 
The Valuation E ffects of Investor Attention in Stock-F inanced Acquisitions 
 
 
???????????????
?
?????????????????????????
 
 
Abstract 
 
Limited investor attention allows overvalued companies to engage in stock-financed acquisitions of listed 
target firms without experiencing significant reductions in their existing valuations. Our robust findings 
show that overvalued stock-paying acquirers that are subject to limited investor attention do not 
experience significant announcement period wealth losses. However, the overvaluation of these acquirers 
is corrected in the post-announcement period. On the contrary, the overvalued acquirers that receive high 
investor attention and use stock as the payment method in their listed-target acquisitions experience 
negative announcement period abnormal returns. The widely documented evidence that stock-financed 
acquisitions are associated with significant announcement period wealth losses is primarily driven by 
deals in which the acquirers are subject to high investor attention. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the stylized findings in the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) literature is that stock-
financed acquisitions of listed targets are associated with significant acquirer wealth losses relative to 
cash-financed counterparts (Fu et al., 2014; Fuller et al., 2002; Golubov et al., 2015; Travlos, 1987).1 The 
negative acquirer abnormal returns associated with such M&As are interpreted as evidence suggesting 
that the acquiring firms are using their overvalued shares to finance their takeovers (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). Emphasizing the role of stock overvaluation as a determinant of the payment method in M&A, the 
theoretical models of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) depict firms 
that aim to benefit from market-optimism-driven overvaluation by being involved in M&As with target 
firms that are relatively less overvalued.? Jensen (2005), in turn, argues that overvalued equity erodes 
managerial discipline and leads to wasteful stock-financed acquisitions. As a result, equity investors treat 
the use of the acquirer?? stock as the payment method in M&As as a signal that such stock is potentially 
overvalued. Consequently, they react to the announcement of such M&As by selling (or short-selling) the 
?????????????????shares (Travlos, 1987). Despite the rich volume of research outputs in the related field,3 
there are still noticeable gaps in our understanding of (a) the trade-off between the gains that the acquiring 
firms (and/or their managers) realize from stock-financed acquisitions when the acquirer?? stock is 
considered to be overvalued and, (b) the shareholders wealth losses arising from the negative market 
reaction around to acquisition announcements. 
In this paper we trace this issue by starting with the premise that the attention of equity investors 
that is dedicated to the acquiring firm is a scarce cognitive resource (Barber and Odean, 2008; Kahneman, 
1973). We primarily argue that the degree of investor attention that an overvalued (acquiring) firm 
receives affects its short- and long-run abnormal returns following the announcement of a merger. 
????????? ????????? ??????????? ???? ????? ??? ????????? ?????????? ??? ???????????? ???? ????????? ????????? (i.e., 
abnormal returns) to corporate announcements. Among others, DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) document a 
weak stock market reaction to the release of corporate news ?????????????????????????????????????????????
with their weekend plans. Similarly, Hirshleifer et al. (2009) report evidence suggesting that the stock 
market?? reaction to earnings surprises is weak on days during which other firms announce earnings 
surprises. Even if the stock market ends up accommodating the impact of bad news, the corporate 
?????????? ????? ???? ??? ????? ???? ????? ?????????????? ??? ???? ???? ???? revealed in their corporate 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1 ????????????? ??? ??????????? ??? ???????? ??? ???????????????????? ??????? ??????? ???????????????????? ???? ?????????????????????? ??????
throughout this paper refers exclusively to listed-target acquisitions. 
2 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
method in an acquisition. These range from the opportunistic desire of the target management to cash out quickly before the 
completion date of the deal (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) ??? ?????????????????????? ???? ??????????????????? ????????? ??????? ???????
point of view (Rhodes?Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004), among others. 
3 For a review see Eckbo (2009). 
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announcements reduces the reputational sanction that they might anticipate (DeHaan et al., 2015). 
Because the content of takeover announcements tends to be highly complex and less standardized than 
other corporate announcements such as earnings or dividends (Louis and Sun, 2010), we predict that 
overvalued firms that are exposed to limited investor attention manage to engage in stock-financed 
acquisitions without experiencing significant announcement period wealth losses. 
A simplified example can further depict how the stock market?? reaction to two stock-financed 
(listed-target) acquisitions, that are announced by two overvalued firms, depends on the degree of investor 
attention that each of the acquiring firms receives. Take the case of two firms i and j whose securities are 
equally overvalued. Such information is only (temporarily) known by the insiders of each of the firms. 
However, firm i receives more investor attention than firm j. If the managers of both firms are short-term 
oriented and expect the same short-term aggregate payoffs from the stock-financed acquisitions, the low 
investor attention dedicated to firm j potentially limits the size of the initial and negative market reaction. 
That is, even if the use of stock as a payment method raises doubts by equity investors that firm j??????????
are overvalued, these investors require an extended period to collect the relevant, and perhaps previously 
overlooked, information to re-assess the valuation of firm j. On the contrary, due to the increased investor 
scrutiny, firm i??? decision to engage in a stock-financed acquisition is likely to trigger significant 
announcement period declines in its existing valuation, which erodes a large part of the short-term 
payoffs. 
This analysis leads to a rich set of empirical predictions about the ???????????short- and long-run 
abnormal returns associated with stock-financed M&As. We primarily argue that these abnormal returns 
will be dependent on the degree of investor scrutiny that the acquiring firm is receiving during a sufficient 
period preceding the day of the merger announcement. First, if limited investor attention reduces the 
degree of the stock market?? reaction to overvaluation-driven stock-financed acquisitions, we expect the 
overvalued firms that are subject to limited investor attention to be more actively involved in stock-
financed acquisitions relative to counterparts that are subject to high investor attention. Second, we expect 
the overvaluation-driven stock-financed acquisitions announced by acquirers subject to limited investor 
scrutiny to be associated with limited wealth losses in the short-run relative to counterparts that are 
subject to high investor attention. Lastly, if the initial market reaction to stock-financed acquisitions 
announced by overvalued acquirers that are exposed to limited investor attention is imperfect, we expect 
these acquirers to experience negative post-acquisition abnormal returns relative to counterparts that 
receive high investor attention. 
By using the acquirer?? pre-acquisition trading volume as a proxy for the degree of investor 
attention, in addition to the overvaluation measure estimated using the method proposed by Rhodes-Kropf 
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et al. (2005), the empirical analysis in this paper offers several new and compelling findings. First, 
evidence from our Logit model predicting the choice of the payment method in the M&A suggests that 
overvalued acquirers that are subject to low investor attention are more likely to engage in stock- rather 
cash-financed deals. This finding reinforces the notion that low investor attention encourages acquirers to 
announce their overvaluation-driven stock-financed deals by anticipating limited reductions in their 
current valuations. 
Second, our analysis of the announcement period Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) suggests 
that overvalued acquirers subject to low investor attention do not experience significant announcement 
period wealth losses around stock-financed acquisitions. Specifically, we find that stock-financed 
acquisitions that are announced by overvalued acquirers subject to low investor attention break-even as in 
the case of cash-financed acquisitions. On the contrary, overvalued acquirers subject to high investor 
attention experience 4 to 6 percentage point declines around the announcement day of stock-financed 
acquisitions. 
To assess the robustness of our findings, we rely on the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
method and re-assess the valuation effects of investor attention across stock-financed deals. Our PSM-
based (robust) findings reveal that the stock-financed deals in which the acquirer is subject to low investor 
attention yield announcement period CAR that is 3.5 percentage points higher than the CAR of 
comparable deals in which the acquirer is subject to high investor scrutiny. To determine the sensitivity of 
our PSM-based findings to the bias caused by potential missing covariates from the matching exercise, we 
rely on the Rosenbaum (2002) bounds analysis. This methodology quantifies the effect that a missing 
covariate should have on the likelihood of the acquirer??? classification into the low investor attention 
group to invalidate our (PSM-based) conclusions. The findings suggest that, for two comparable deals, a 
missing covariate should increase the likelihood of the acquirer???????????? to low investor scrutiny by 
more than 50% to invalidate our PSM-based conclusions. When assessed relative to previous findings in 
the corporate finance literature (Barbopoulos and Adra, 2016; Peel and Makepeace, 2012), this evidence 
suggests that our findings are, to a large extent, insensitive to the effect of a confounding variable. 
To further highlight the role of the acquirer?? overvaluation and its interaction with the degree of 
investor attention dedicated to the acquiring firm, we re-estimate our multivariate regressions on the 
matched (treated and control) sample. The results confirm our initial conclusions by emphasizing a 
significant negative valuation effect of the acquirer?? overvaluation in deals subject to high investor 
attention. Moreover, this negative wealth effect is neutralized in the group of deals announced by 
acquirers subject to low investor attention. 
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Our third task is to examine ???????????????????potential time fractions in assessing the valuation 
effects of overvaluation-driven stock-financed acquisitions announced by companies subject to low (high) 
investor attention. Our analysis reveals that overvaluation-driven stock-financed acquisitions that are 
announced by acquirers subject to low investor attention are associated with significant post-acquisition 
losses. Put together, these findings suggest that the correction of the acquirer?? overvaluation is not 
immediate but rather depends on the degree of attention dedicated by equity investors to the acquiring 
firm during the period preceding the M&A announcement. Overall, the widely cited evidence that stock-
financed M&As are associated with immediate announcement period wealth losses is driven by deals 
announced by acquirers subject to high rather than low investor attention during the period preceding the 
M&A announcement. The overvaluation of stock-paying acquirers subject to limited investor attention is 
only corrected in the long-run. 
The results of this paper contribute to the arrays of studies related to both M&A and investor 
scrutiny. Specifically, this paper highlights the moderating role of investor scrutiny in the relationship 
between the choice of payment method in M&A and the acquirer abnormal returns. Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) emphasize the role of the acquiring ???????
overvaluation in motivating the initiation of stock-financed acquisitions. In the attention-related literature, 
Louis and Sun (2010) ????? ????? ???? ?????? ????????? ????????? ??? ?????? ????? ????????????? ??? ?????? ???
Fridays. Louis and Sun (2010) attribute this result to the limited investor attention of stock market 
participants preoccupied with their weekend plans. Our findings extend both results by showing that 
overvalued acquirers exploit the limited investor scrutiny to announce their stock-financed acquisitions. 
Moreover, our analysis of the long-run wealth effects of stock-financed acquisitions demonstrates that the 
stock market requires a considerable period to correct the acquirer?? overvaluation when the acquiring 
firm is subject to low market scrutiny. Our results also complement the recent findings by DeHaan et al. 
(2015) and Michaely et al. (2016) related to the efforts of corporate managers to exploit the limited 
investor attention to strategically time their corporate announcements. Lastly, our findings are robust to 
alternative model specifications and measures of investor attention such as the Roll (1988) non-
synchronicity measure. 
We proceed as follows: Section 2 presents a parsimonious model that determines the conditions 
under which overvalued acquirers proceed with stock-financed M&As without experiencing large 
announcement period wealth losses; Section 3 describes our proxies of investor attention and acquirer 
overvaluation; Section 4 presents our dataset and discusses both the sample statistics and the univariate 
results; Section 5 presents and discusses the sensitivities related to the decision of the acquirer to use its 
stock in the financing process of the deal, as well as the multivariate analysis of the acquirer short-run 
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abnormal returns; Section 6 illustrates the PSM-based findings and the Rosenbaum (2002) bounds 
sensitivity analysis; Section 7 discusses the long-run acquirer abnormal returns; Section 8 demonstrates 
how our multivariate results hold when we employ an alternative measures of acquirer investor attention: 
the Roll R2, and finally, Section 9 offers a conclusion. 
 
2. The Choice of Overvaluation-driven Stock F inancing 
Consider a potential acquiring firm whose market value temporarily exceeds its fundamental 
value by ? ? ?, which is only known to the acquiring firm???insiders. The insiders, who understand the 
temporary aspect of this overvaluation, are considering the prospects of exploiting their excess valuation 
in a stock-financed acquisition to realize short-term payoffs from increasing their ??????? size. The net 
payoff from such acquisition is presented as follows: 
 ?????????? ? ???? ? ?? ? ???? ? ?? (1) 
? ? ? is a factor representing the acquiring f?????? ???????? to realize short-term gains before the entire 
extent of overvaluation is captured by equity investors. In the presence of principal agent problems, ? can 
represent the managerial privileges after relying on stock-??????????????????????????????????????? (Jensen, 
2005). The costs associated with a stock-financed acquisition have two components. ?? ? ? is a factor 
reflecting the additional deal-related costs that arise from the use of overvalued stock, as a fraction of the 
degree of overvaluation. For instance, if the firm insists on financing the deal with its own stock, the 
target firm might demand higher premium to participate in the deal. Therefore, the product ??? is the 
additional payment that the acquiring firm is willing to make to the target in order to convince the target 
shareholders to accept its shares as the medium of exchange. In turn, ?? are costs of the deal such as 
?????????????????? and the advisory fees. 
? is the part of the ?????????? ??????? overvaluation that is corrected at the time of the deal?? 
announcement with ? ? ? ? ?. Because the value of ? is primarily dependent on the extent to which the 
market participants investigate the acquirer?? degree of overvaluation and their attempts to correct it, can 
be presented as follows: 
 ? ? ?? (2) 
with ? ? ?. The size of ? is a positive function of ? which is the level of investor attention dedicated to 
the acquiring firm. Even if the acquirer uses overvalued shares as a payment method in the deal, the 
limited investor attention dedicated to the acquiring firm during the period preceding the deal?? 
announcement complicates the task of market participants to correctly re-valuate the acquirer?? shares. In 
particular, in order to accurately determine the extent of the acquirer?? overvaluation, market participants 
have to re-assess the information released through previous corporate announcements, accounting data, 
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and price fluctuations that they have overlooked. Given that various other corporate events are also 
??????????????????????????????????????????????sk of re-evaluating the acquirer?? shares is likely to require an 
extended period beyond the limited window around the takeover announcement. 
Replacing (2) in (1) with ?????????? ? ? yields: 
 ? ? ? ?? ? ???? ? ?????  (3) 
When the level of investor attention is relatively high, i.e. above the threshold 
??????????
??? , the 
announcement of a stock-financed deal leads to substantial corrections in the acquirer??? existing 
valuation. Such corrections erode the gains that the acquirer expects from the deal. In the presence of 
agency problems, the significant announcement period wealth losses can also jeopardize the position of 
the acquiring ??????? managers that decide to engage in a wealth-destroying overvaluation-driven 
acquisition. 
The immediate consequence of this argument is that firms subject to limited investor attention 
?? ? ????????????? ? are encouraged to use their overvalued shares as the medium of exchange in M&As. 
Empirically, we predict that the acquiring firms subject to limited investor scrutiny announce 
overvaluation-driven stock-financed M&As that are associated with limited short-run wealth losses. We 
further predict that the overvaluation of these acquiring firms is only corrected in the post-M&A-
announcement period. 
 
3. Measures of Investor Attention and F irm Overvaluation 
This section presents the investor attention proxy that we employ in this paper, as well as the 
measures of valuation error of the acquiring firm. The proxy for investor attention is based on the fraction 
of ???? ?????????? traded shares relative to its listed shares in the days preceding the acquisition 
announcement.4 The underlying assumption supporting this proxy is that the firms subject to high investor 
attention are those with relatively large fraction of their shares subject to daily trading activity. The 
measure of firm-specific overvaluation, in turn, is based on the method proposed by Rhodes-Kropf et al. 
(2005) via which we decompose the acquir?????????? market-to-book value ratio. 
 
 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
4 In the robustness section, ??????????????????R2 measure as a proxy of investor attention. We discuss in detail the relevance of 
this proxy in the Section 8. We thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging the incorporation of a second measure in our 
analysis. 
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3.1. Trading volume 
The volume of a ???????traded shares has been used in previous research as a proxy of the degree 
of investor attention. The seminal paper of Miller (1977) suggests that high trading volume causes 
investors to look in more detail at a particular stock. Gervais et al. (2001) show that the increase in a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? high demand. The same authors show that stocks 
subject to high trading activities are traded at a premium. Kaniel et al. (2012) further show that the value-
return premium is present in both developed and developing markets. They also attribute their results to 
Merton's (1987) recognition theory which suggests that the increase in attention to particular stocks 
boosts their value due to (a) the reduction in the estimation risk faced by traders and, (b) the facilitation of 
risk sharing. 
In this paper, we use the standardized trading volume of the acquiring firm before the acquisition 
announcement as a measure of investor attention. For the period from 43 to 10 days before the acquisition 
announcement, we estimate the average daily percentage of the traded shares relative to all listed shares. 
An acquiring firm is considered subject to high investor attention when the average daily percentage of 
traded shares relative to all listed shares exceeds the 70th percentile in the corresponding sample (i.e. High 
Trading). Otherwise, the firm is considered subject to low pre-acquisition investor attention and 
consequently subject to low trading activity (i.e. Low Trading).? 
 
3.2. F irm Overvaluation and Book-to-Market Decomposition 
In order to quantify the degree of acquirer valuation error in our analysis, we decompose the 
book-to-market value of the acquirer into its components of growth option and misvaluation, as in 
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) and Fu et al. (2014). Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) decompose a ???????market-
to-book value ratio into three components: firm-specific valuation error, time-series sector-specific 
valuation error and, long-run growth potentials. 
In particular, the log market-to-book value ratio ?? ? ??????????? can be presented as follows: 
 ??? ? ??? ? ???? ? ??????? ??????? ????? ? ?
???????????????????
? ???????? ???? ? ??????? ????????? ? ?????? ? ?
????????????????????????
? ???????? ??? ? ???????? ????
?????????????
 (4) 
with ??? and ??? indicating the log of market value ???? and book value ????, respectively, of firm ? at 
month ?. ??? ? ??????? ???? ??? ???? ??????????? ???????? ???? ??????? ?????????? ???? ???? sector?s valuation, 
which is represented by ??????? ????. ??????? ???? ? ??????? ??? is the difference between the sector-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
5 Our results remain insensitive to the use of different percentiles as cutoff points that determine whether the acquiring firm 
receives high or low investor attention, such as 75th, 80th, 85th, and 90th. 
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specific valuation and the long-run industry multiple ??????? ???. Finally, ??????? ??? ? ??? is the long-
run value-to-book measure of the firm, which is a proxy for its growth potentials. 
We proceed by estimating the cross-sectional regressions of the acquirer?s market value on its 
book value, by sector j and year t. Rhodes?Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) propose the following models: 
 ???????? ? ??? ? ???????????? ? ??? (5) 
 ???????? ? ??? ? ???????????? ? ?????????????? ? ????????????????????? ? ??? (6) 
 ???????? ? ??? ? ???????????? ? ?????????????? ? ????????????????????? ? ????????? ? ??? (7) 
where: ?????? is the log book value of the acquiring firm ?, ???????? is the log absolute value of the 
acquirer net income, ??????? is a binary indicator taking the value of 1 when ?? ? ?, and ??? is the 
market leverage of firm ?. Our reported estimations are obtained through the Equation (5).6 
Therefore, we predict the firm- and industry- specific valuation errors of firm ? by using the fitted 
coefficients from Equation (5) and their average values as: 
 ??????? ???? ? ??? ? ????????????? (8) 
 ??????? ??? ? ?? ? ???????????? (9) 
with   
 
?? ? ?
???
?
?
???
 (10) 
 
???? ? ?
?????
?
?
???
 (11) 
which predict the two misevaluation components, as: 
 ???????????????????? ? ??? ? ??????? ???? (12) 
 ????????????????????? ? ??????? ???? ? ??????? ??? (13) 
Accordingly, our overall acquirer overvaluation measure is the sum of both the firm- and sector-
specific valuation errors. To reduce the impact of the measurement error in our subsequent analysis, 
rather than introducing the continuous overvaluation measure, we use the dummy variable 
??????????????????? which is assigned the value of 1 if the acquirer has a positive valuation error, and 
0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
6 Our results remain qualitatively similar with slightly smaller samples when Equations (6) and (7) are estimated. 
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4. Data 
4.1. Sample construction 
Our sample consists of all US domestic friendly public-to-public M&A from the Securities Data 
Corporation?s (SDC) Thomson One Database that satisfy the following sample-selection criteria: (a) the 
M&A is announced between January 1st, 2002 and December 31st, 2014 and the deal was completed with 
a disclosed dollar value that exceeds the $1 million threshold; (b) the acquirer controls 100% of the target 
?????????? ??????????????????????????; (c) the deal payment is settled in either cash or stock; and (d) no 
takeovers by the same acquirer occur within five trading days around the deal announcement (i.e. the 
event window analyzed)?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????proxies for the acquirer 
and target valuation errors (see Equations 4 to 13), and market-to-book values of both the acquirer and 
target firms are covered in the Datastream database and verified in Compustat. 
The restriction that both merging firms are publicly listed ensures that the relevant firm-specific 
variables are disclosed and hence available to be used in our empirical analysis. The restriction that the 
acquirer ends up controlling 100% of the target is introduced to ensure that the acquirers in the sample 
have the same objective of full target ownership. Moreover, the sample is limited to full cash and full 
stock financed deals in order to explicitly distinguish between the two payment methods across our 
analysis, as in Golubov et al. (2015). 
Table 1 presents the annual distribution of our sampled deals (=513) according to the payment 
method of the deal, acquirer and target industry relatedness, and the target ??????? specific industrial 
sector. Panel A shows the annual distribution of the deals in which: (a) cash or stock is used as the 
payment method, and (b) the acquisitions are either focused (diversifying) whereby the acquirer and the 
target do (not) share the same two-digit SIC code. Panel A depicts a pro-cyclical variation in M&A 
activities with a peak in 2007 (68 deals) followed by a decline during the years of the great recession (38 
yearly deals in 2008 and 2009). The same Panel also shows that the largest fractions of M&As in the 
sample are cash-financed (65.89%) and industry focused (64.13%). At the target ??????????????????sector 
level (reported in Panel B), the largest fractions of deals in the sample are in the high technology and 
financial sectors, with respective percentages of 28.27% and 22.81%. In turn, the lowest fractions of deals 
in the sample are in the retail, real estate and media sectors. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables entering our empirical analysis, i.e. 
firm- and deal-specific factors that are controlled for in our multivariate analysis. As in Barbopoulos et 
al., (2012) and Fuller et al. (2002), the acquirer CAR is measured as the sum of the daily differences 
between the acquirer returns and the returns of an overall market index (NYSE firms) over the 5-day 
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event-window (t-2, t+2) around the deal?? announcement day (i.e. day t=0). The acquirer CAR mean of 
0.23% confirms the findings in previous research that the average M&A does not add value to the 
shareholders of the acquiring firm (Alexandridis et al., 2010). However, the high standard deviation of the 
acquirer CAR suggests a substantial variation in the acquirer?? wealth effects. To measure the post-
acquisition returns, we follow Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) by estimating the acquirer?? holding 
period excess returns over the corresponding market index returns, which are estimated for the holding 
periods of 12 and 24 months from the end of the acquisition completion month. We exclude the multiple 
deals announced by the same acquirer during, before and after the calendar month of the acquisition 
announcement to ensure that the long-run acquirer abnormal returns in various deals are not conflated. 
Our initial findings suggest that M&As are, on average, associated with post-acquisition declines of the 
acquirer value in the 12 months (-6.33%) and 24 months (-9.19%) following the second month from the 
??????????????????????????? ????, consistent with earlier studies such as Loughran and Vijh (1997). 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
To ensure that the size and growth opportunity of both merging firms are properly controlled for 
in our analysis, the acquirer and the target firms? market values and market-to-book value ratios, at 43 
days before the acquisition?? announcement day, are introduced in the relevant models. Moreover, to 
highlight the relevance of the pre-acquisition variation of ???????????????????????????????????????????ing 
????????????????????? standard deviations of abnormal returns during the period from t-240 to t-43 days, 
where t ??? ???????????????????????????????day, are added. To control for the effect of toeholds and the 
presence of large block-holders, (a) the percentage of target shares owned by the acquiring firm before the 
deal announcement, and (b) the presence of a positive percentage of acquirer?? shares that are closely held 
by block-holders, are introduced to the model. While Datastream reports the percentage of target shares 
that are closely held by a small number of shareholders, the inclusion of this variable in the analysis 
substantially reduces the sample in the estimation???????????????????????????????????????????????-to-assets 
ratio and returns on assets 43 days before the announcement of the deal are added in the model. Appendix 
1 provides a detailed description, as well as the source and construction of each variable that we use in 
our analysis. 
Based on our estimation of the acquirer?? valuation-error measure, the acquirers in 247 deals 
overall, and in 73 stock-financed acquisitions, are classified as overvalued, i.e. with a positive Rhodes-
Kropf et al. (2005) valuation-error. In robustness checks, we impose higher cut-off values to determine 
whether the acquirer is overvalued such as the 5%, 10%, and 15% levels without finding an alteration in 
our conclusions. 
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4.2. Univariate analysis 
Table 3 presents the results of our univariate analysis of the acquirer CAR across portfolios 
classified by the payment method and the levels of pre-acquisition trading activity of the acquirer?? 
shares. Consistent with the conclusions reached in previous studies, the univariate analysis suggests that 
stock-financed acquisitions are associated with significantly lower acquirer CAR relative to cash-financed 
counterparts (1.18 percentage points lower acquirer CAR that is marginally significant). Interestingly, the 
substantial reduction in the acquirer CAR in stock-financed acquisitions is concentrated in the group of 
deals announced by acquirers subject to high investor attention. This portfolio experiences significant 
wealth losses relative to both the portfolio of cash-financed deals (3.18% wealth loss, significant at the 
5% level) and the portfolio of stock-financed deals that are announced by acquirers subject to low 
investor attention (3.28% relative wealth loss, significant at the 5% level). In the latter portfolio, the 
acquirer CAR of -0.09 percentage points is statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the 
acquirer?? shareholder wealth losses from stock-financed M&As when the acquirer is subject to low 
investor attention is apparent in the post-acquisition period. Specifically, in the 12- and 24-month post-
acquisition period, the stock-financed M&As that are announced by acquirers subject to low investor 
attention are associated with 8.5 and 12.66 percentage point declines of the acquirer value, as captured by 
the acquirer Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR). 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
The univariate differences in the post-acquisition abnormal returns between the stock-financed 
M&As subject to high investor attention and their counterparts subject to low investor attention are 
economically large, yet statistically insignificant. In the subsequent sections, we re-evaluate these 
differences via a multivariate analysis that further allows us to highlight the impact of the acquirer?? pre-
acquisition overvaluation. 
 
5. Multivariate Evidence 
5.1. The ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
A central part of our analysis is to investigate whether low investor attention encourages 
overvalued acquirers to proceed with stock-financed M&As. As such, overvalued acquirers subject to low 
investor attention should be more likely to announce stock- rather than cash-financed M&As. Table 4 
presents the outcome of two Logit models that predict the choice of the payment method (stock vs. cash) 
based on the acquirer?? valuation-error and various firm- and deal-specific features. Model (1) does not 
control for year- and industry-related factors while Model (2) does take them into account. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
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The initial findings emphasize the role of low investor attention in encouraging overvalued 
acquirers to announce stock- rather cash-financed M&As. In particular, the coefficient associated with the 
variable (Overvalued Acquirer × Low Trading) is positive, significant, and considerably larger in 
magnitude than the coefficient of (Overvalued Acquirer) both when the industry and year effects are 
included and excluded from the relevant model. This finding supports our empirical prediction by 
suggesting that overvalued acquirers subject to low rather than high trading activity are more likely to 
announce stock-financed M&As. The following subsection examines whether such acquirers, despite 
their high degree of overvaluation, end up realizing limited wealth losses during the announcement period 
due to the low investor attention dedicated to them. 
 
5.2. Multivariate Analysis of CAR 
The findings reported in Table 5 depict the valuation effects of stock-financed M&As that are 
announced by acquirers subject to different levels of investor attention. The dependent variable is the 
acquirer?? 5-day announcement period CAR. Models (1), (2) and (3) have the following general 
specification: 
 
????????????? ? ?? ? ???????? ? ????????? ? ????????????? ????????
?
???
? ?? (14) 
??? is the intercept referring to the acquirer CAR in cash-financed acquisitions. ?? ? ?? refers to the 
average announcement period CAR of stock-financed deals by acquirers that receive high investor 
attention. In turn, ?? ? ?? ? ?? is the acquirer announcement period CAR of stock-financed deals in 
which the acquirer receives low investor attention (i.e. low pre-acquisition trading activity). Accordingly, 
?? represents the difference between the valuation effects of stock-financed acquisitions that are 
announced by acquirers subject to low versus high investor attention. ? ?????????  represents the effects of 
k control variables known to influence the acquirer abnormal returns. 
Model (1) is a baseline regression that only controls for the effect of the payment method and the 
level of investor attention received by the acquiring firm. The evidence reported in Model (1) suggests 
that, relative to cash-financed deals, stock-financed acquisitions announced by acquirers subject to high 
pre-acquisition trading activity experience a 4.41 percentage point decline in their existing valuations. As 
documented in previous research (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Draper and Paudyal, 1999; Fuller 
et al., 2002), cash-financed deals realize insignificant announcement period abnormal returns, as 
evidenced by the insignificant intercept. Furthermore, consistent with our predictions, the stock paying 
acquirers that are subject to low investor attention realize 4.17 percentage points higher CAR than their 
counterparts who are subject to high investor attention. That is, the negative wealth effect of stock-
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financed acquisitions when the acquirer is subject to high investor attention seems to be neutralized in the 
portfolio of stock-financed deals that are announced by acquirers subject to low investor attention. 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
To further clarify this conclusion, we apply the Wald test on the restriction that the coefficient of 
(Stock) and the coefficient of (Stock × Low Trading) are equal in magnitude but have opposite signs. The 
resulting p-value is 0.80, leading to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis. Accordingly, the acquisitions 
announced by acquirers that are subject to low investor attention do not experience negative 
announcement period abnormal returns. Instead, the acquirers in these deals break-even, as in the case of 
counterparts in cash-financed acquisitions. Model (2) expands the specification of Model (1) by 
controlling for the effect of the acquirer?? overvaluation, which yields similar conclusions. Moreover, the 
restriction that the coefficient of (Stock) and the coefficient of (Stock × Low Trading) are equal in 
magnitude but have opposite signs is also not rejected in Model (2) (p-values of 0.66). 
Model (3) controls for various firm- and deal-related factors in addition to the industry and year 
fixed effects. The results of this model suggest that the stock-financed acquisitions announced by 
acquirers subject to high investor attention realize five percentage point decline in their existing 
valuations. Moreover, the stock-financed M&As announced by acquirers subject to low investor attention 
realize a four percentage point increase in their valuations relative to the stock-financed M&As that are 
announced by acquirers subject to high investor attention. The restriction that the coefficient of (Stock) 
and the coefficient of (Stock × Low Trading) are equal in magnitude but have opposite signs is not 
rejected either in Model (3) (p-value of 0.12). 
To directly highlight the effect of acquirer?? overvaluation and ???????????investor attention on the 
acquirer CAR, Models (4) and (5) have the following specification: 
? ????????????? ? ?? ? ???????? ? ????????? ? ????????????????????? ?? ?????????
? ???????????????????? ?? ????????????? ???????
?
???
? ???
?????
?? ? ?? ? ???is the average CAR of overvalued acquirers that are exposed to high investor attention and 
engage in stock-financed M&As. In turn, ?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?? is the average CAR of overvalued acquirers 
that are exposed to low investor attention and engage in stock-financed M&As. Therefore, the sign and 
magnitude of ?? reflect the impact of acquirer exposure to low investor ?????????? ??? ???? ?????????
assessment of stock-financed deals that are announced by overvalued acquirers. Interestingly, the results 
in Models (4) and (5) show that the negative valuation effects of acquirer overvaluation across stock-
financed acquisitions that are announced by acquirers subject to high investor attention is offset in the 
portfolio of deals that are announced by acquirers subject to low investor attention. More specifically, the 
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Wald test of the restriction ?? ? ??? does not reject the null hypothesis with p-values of 0.14 and 0.48 in 
Models (4) and (5), respectively. 
Put together, the results of our multivariate analysis support the key empirical prediction of this 
paper that the overvalued stock-paying acquirers subject to low investor attention manage to announce 
their takeovers without experiencing significant announcement period wealth losses. The Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) analysis in the subsequent section further validates this conclusion. 
 
6. Analysis of Comparable Deals 
6.1. PSM analysis 
The novel result presented in Section 5 suggests that stock-financed M&As that are announced by 
acquirers subject to low investor attention yield higher acquirer CAR relative to counterparts announced 
by acquirers subject to high investor attention. The matching-based analysis offered in this section 
examines whether this conclusion holds when comparing deals with similar characteristics. We apply the 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) analysis exclusively on the sample of stock-financed acquisitions. To 
ensure that the matched sample is representative of treated and untreated observations, the dummy 
variable (?Low Trading? or ?Low Investor Attention?) ??? ????????? ???? ?????? ??? ?? ??? ???? ???????????
percentage of pre-acquisition daily traded shares (traded relative to all shares) exceeds the median, rather 
than the 70th percentile, in the corresponding sample, and 0 otherwise. After balancing the key firm- and 
deal-related factors in addition to the magnitude of acquirer?? overvaluation between acquirers exposed to 
low and high investor attention (i.e. between the treated and control portfolios), we estimate the valuation 
effects of low investor attention across stock-financed acquisitions. 
Smith and Todd (2005) suggest that the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) is the 
most common evaluation parameter. In the context of the present ????????analysis of the acquirer CAR, 
ATT can be defined as: 
 ??? ? ?????????????????????????? ? ??????????????????????????? ? ?? (16) 
This parameter represents the average impact of low investor attention dedicated to the acquiring firm on 
the acquirer CAR relative to the counterfactual case in which the acquirer receives high investor attention. 
If the economic conclusion presented in Section 5 holds, we expect the resulting ATT to be positive, 
statistically and economically significant. 
In estimating ATT, a missing data problem emerges: while we have access to the acquirer CAR in 
stock-financed M&As that announced by acquirers receiving low investor attention, we do not have 
access to data representing the counterfactual case in which these acquirers receive high investor 
attention. Nevertheless, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985, 1983) show that conditioning on known propensity 
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scores ???? that have been estimated using observable characteristics W, with each propensity score 
representing the probability of the acquirer receiving low rather than high investor attention, is sufficient 
to remove the bias due to these observed covariates. Consequently, we adopt the following two-step 
procedure: First, on the restricted sample of stock-financed deals, we estimate a Logit model based on the 
acquirer-, deal- and target-specific characteristics with the dependent variable being the acquirer that is 
subject to low pre-acquisition trading activity (i.e. low investor attention). Second, the fitted probability 
estimates from this model (i.e. the propensity scores) are used in the matching analysis to create a 
matched sample of comparable deals that are announced by acquirers exposed to low and high investor 
attention. On the matched sample ATT is estimated with the following equation: 
 ??? ?
? ???????????????????????????? ? ????????????????????????????????????????????
?
?
? ?????????????? ? ?? ? ?????????????
?????
? ? ??????????????
?
???
?  
(17) 
ATT is the mean difference between the acquirer CAR in each stock-financed deal that is announced by 
an acquirer subject to low trading, ???????????????????????????, and the mean acquirer CAR for 
comparable stock-financed deals that are announced by acquirers subject to high pre-acquisition trading, 
????????????????????????????. ? is the number of stock-financed deals that are announced by 
acquirers subject to low pre-acquisition trading on the matched sample (i.e. the treated observations). ? is 
the number of control (observations) deals that are announced by overvalued acquirers subject to high 
investor attention. ????? is the number of times a deal ? is used as a match when matching is performed 
with replacement. 
More specifically, based on the caliper matching (CM) algorithm, for each stock-financed deal 
announced by an acquirer subject to low pre-acquisition trading (i.e. treated observation), we match four 
stock-financed deals (untreated observations) that are announced by acquirers subject to high pre-
acquisition trading which exhibit propensity scores that do not exceed 10% of the standard deviation of 
the propensity score estimates. As the sample is split in half between deals announced by acquirers 
subject to low and high pre-acquisition trading, we use matching with replacement whereby each 
untreated observation can be chosen as a match more than once. As Panel B (Table 6) shows, the resulting 
matched sample includes 24 treated observations and 96 untreated observations, whereby the matches are 
used more than once. Overall, 36 observations are dropped from the sample of stock-financed deals via 
the matching algorithm. Panel D (Table 6) demonstrates the success of the matching exercise in balancing 
the key empirical covariates in the analysis. More specifically, none of the differences in the means of 
both the estimated propensity scores and the key covariates between the treated and untreated groups 
appear statistically significant based on the reported t-tests in the matched sample. 
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(Insert Table 6 about here) 
The estimation of standard errors is of critical importance in testing the hypothesis of the absence 
of a treatment effect. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) emphasize the importance of incorporating the 
variance due to the estimation of propensity scores in the overall variance of the treatment effect. Abadie 
and Imbens (2008) show that estimators resulting from bootstrap procedures are not valid even under the 
simple conditions of a single continuous covariate and an unbiased ???? normally distributed estimator. 
The results of the Abadie and Imbens (2008) simulation show that the variance estimator they developed 
earlier (Abadie and Imbens, 2006) tends to perform well even with small samples. Consequently, in 
testing the null hypothesis of zero ATT??the Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard errors are employed in the 
t-tests and reported with the ATT estimate. 
As Panel B (Table 6) shows, the resulting ATT estimate is 3.5 percentage points and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This offers great support to the initial conclusion derived from both the 
univariate and the multivariate analyses (presented in Section 5). That is, after balancing the key 
covariates, ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the stock paying acquirers subject to low pre-acquisition trading activity (or low investor attention) enjoy 
higher announcement period CAR relative to acquirers in comparable deals where the acquirers are 
subject to high pre-acquisition trading (or high investor attention). This provides additional evidence 
suggesting that firms that receive limited investor attention and use stock as a payment method in M&As 
enjoy significant appreciations in their existing valuations relative to stock paying acquirers that receive 
high investor attention.? However, one issue that still remains to be accommodated is to ensure that our 
results are insensitive to unobserved bias or missing covariates. In the following subsection, we examine 
the sensitivity of our PSM-based findings by quantifying the impact that a missing covariate should have 
in order to invalidate the treatment effect. 
To assess whether the initial conclusion from our multivariate analysis holds on the matched 
sample, we estimate the following model on the sample of comparable stock-financed deals: 
? ????????????? ? ?? ? ?????????????????????? ?? ??????????????????????? ?
? ????????????? ???????
?
???
? ???
?????
where ?? is the acquirer CAR due to the announcement of an acquisition by an overvalued acquirer 
subject to high investor attention while ?? ? ?? presents the acquirer CAR due to the announcement of 
an acquisition by an overvalued acquirer subject to low investor attention. The findings show that stock-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
7 On the matched sample, the average acquirer CAR of stock-financed acquisitions that are announced by acquirers subject to low 
pre-acquisition trading is -0.37% and statistically insignificant, which supports the view that these acquirers do not experience 
immediate announcement period wealth losses. 
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financed M&As that are announced by overvalued acquirers subject to high investor attention are 
associated with 11.5% decline in the acquirer existing valuation. However, in line with the conclusions of 
the initial multivariate analysis, this negative relationship is neutralized in the group of stock-financed 
M&As that are announced by overvalued acquirers subject to low investor attention. 
 
6.2. Sensitivity analysis 
A central aspect of the PSM method is that it mainly attempts to reduce the bias that is due to 
??????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? (Heckman and Robb, 1985). Hence, 
the failure to introduce relevant variables to the matching analysis can lead to biased ATT estimates and 
inaccurate conclusions. Along these lines, Rosenbaum (2002) develops a sensitivity analysis that can 
accompany the use of PSM. In the context of this ???????? analysis, the Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity 
analysis answers the question: how strong a missing covariate needs to be, in terms of influencing the 
odds that the stock-financed acquisition is announced by an acquirer receiving low investor attention, in 
order invalidate the initial PSM-based conclusions? 
In his analysis, Rosenbaum (2002) presents the parameter ? which in the context of this ????????
analysis can be presented in the following relation: 
 
?
? ?
?????????????? ? ?? ?
? ? ?????????????? ? ?? ?
?????????????? ? ?? ?
?? ? ?????????????? ? ?? ??
? ? (19) 
when ? ? ?, the assignment of an acquirer with low market attention between the two matched deals is 
equivalent to a random assignment. As the value of ? increases, this assignment no longer remains a 
random procedure. As shown by Rosenbaum (2002), the fraction of odds can be written as: 
 ?????????????? ? ?? ?
? ? ?????????????? ? ?? ?
?????????????? ? ?? ?
?? ? ?????????????? ? ?? ??
? ?????
??? ? ????
???????? ? ????
? ???????? ? ??? (20) 
where????? represents the impact of the observed covariates which cancel out. ?? and ?? are the 
unobserved covariates influencing the presence of the treatment for units ? and ? respectively. ??represents 
the influence of these covariates on the choice of treatment. Normalizing ? ? ?? ? ?? between 0 and 1, ? 
can be written as ? ? ??and a straightforward interpretation is that the matched units may differ in their 
odds of receiving the treatment by at most ? (Rosenbaum, 2002). 
Panel B (Table 6) reports the outcome of the sensitivity analysis. Specifically, a missing covariate 
should increase the relative odds that a stock-paying acquirer is subject to low investor attention by 47% 
for the treatment effect to cease to be significant at the 5% level, and by 59% for this treatment effect to 
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cease to be significant at the 10% level. These results suggest that our empirical conclusion is relatively 
insensitive to the effect of a missing covariate, especially when compared to other studies that relied on 
the Rosenbaum (2002) analysis in the empirical finance literature. For instance, Peel and Makepeace 
(2012) report a ? level of 1.55 to highlight the robustness of their conclusion regarding the premium 
received by accounting auditors. Likewise, Barbopoulos and Adra (2016) report a ? level of 1.50 to 
highlight the robustness of their conclusion with respect to the initial payments in earnout financed deals. 
 
7. Analysis of the Long-Run Returns 
Next, we focus on the acquirer?? long-run abnormal returns and attempt to investigate how they 
vary with the level of acquirer?? overvaluation, the payment method employed in the deal, and the degree 
of investor attention that is received by the acquiring firm in the period preceding ???? ???????
announcement. I?? ????????????? ????????????????????????????????????-financed deals by highly scrutinized 
acquirers is complete, we do not expect these acquirers to experience post-acquisition losses. 
To further emphasize the role of the interaction between the acquirer?? overvaluation, the 
payment method, and the degree of investor attention, Models (1) and (2) have the following 
specification: 
? ???????????????
? ?? ? ???????? ? ????????? ? ????????????????????? ?? ?????????
? ???????????????????? ?? ????????????? ???????
?
???
? ????
?????
where??? ? ?? ? ??? is the average BHAR of overvalued acquirers that are exposed to high investor 
attention across stock-financed acquisitions. In turn, ?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?? is the average BHAR of 
overvalued acquirers in stock-financed deals which are subject to low investor attention. Therefore, the 
sign and magnitude of ?? highlight the impact of low acquirer investor attention on the post-acquisition 
value gains from stock-financed deals announced by overvalued acquirers. The dependent variable in 
Model (1) is the 12-month (? ? ??? acquirer BHAR while the dependent variable in Model (2) is the 24-
month (? ? ??? BHAR. 
We test the restriction ?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? using the Wald test in both Models (1) and (2). The 
resulting p-values of the Wald test are 0.78 and 0.45 respectively, which suggests that the post-acquisition 
BHAR of stock-financed acquisitions by overvalued acquirers subject to high investor attention is 
economically insignificant. Hence, the initial negative reaction to stock-financed acquisitions by 
overvalued acquirers subject to high investor scrutiny captures the full wealth effect of the M&A. 
Interestingly, in both models, we find that ??, i.e. the coefficient of (Stock × Overvalued Acquirer × Low 
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Trading) is negative and statistically significant, highlighting 15 and 39 respective percentage point post-
acquisition wealth losses for overvalued stock paying acquirers subject to low investor attention. 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
To further support the notion that the initial less adverse market response to stock-financed 
acquisitions that are announced by acquirers subject to low investor attention is not due to high post-
acquisition synergies, we analyse the acquirer?s post-acquisition performance as in Heron and Lie (2002). 
We re-estimate Equation (21) with the dependent variables ?????????????????????????-acquisition return on 
assets (RoA) for the 12- and 24-month horizons.8 If the initial less adverse response is due to high 
synergies, then after controlling for the acquirer?? pre-acquisition RoA and various deal- and firm-related 
factors, we should observe that the acquirers in stock-financed deals by overvalued acquirers subject to 
low investor attention should experience increases in their post-acquisition RoA. The lack of positive and 
significant post-???????????? ???????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ?????? ??????? ??????????? ??????????? in 
Models (3) and (4) suggests that the less adverse market reaction to these acquirers is not driven by high 
expected post-acquisition synergies. Put together, the evidence from the initial market response and the 
???????????????-acquisition abnormal returns and performance support our prediction regarding the role of 
low market attention in encouraging overvalued firms to pursue stock financed non-synergy-driven 
acquisitions.9 
 
8. Robustness Checks 
8.1. An alternative investor attention proxy 
We further examine whether our findings related to the short- and long-run valuation effects of 
investor attention hold with an alternative proxy. Accordingly, we re-estimate our multivariate models 
using the high Roll (1988) R2 as a proxy for low investor attention. More specifically, the R2 refers to the 
explanatory power of the regression: 
 ???? ? ?? ? ???????? ? ??????????? ? ???? (22) 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
8 We thank the anonymous reviewer for suggesting this alternative interpretation. 
9 An anonymous reviewer recommended that we apply the robust methodology proposed by Bessembinder and Zhang (2013) 
which, in the context of our analysis, consists of examining the variations in the monthly difference between the logarithm of 
??????????? ???????? ????????-financed deals announced by overvalued acquirers subject to low investor attention and comparable 
stock-financed deals announced by acquirers subject to high investor attention. This analysis consists of using as independent 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-to-book valuations, idiosyncratic risk and momentum of returns, among 
others. Our analysis based on 18 size and market-to-book value matches suggests that, in the 24 months horizon, the overvalued 
acquirers subject to low investor attention end up realizing 71% of the wealth realized by the overvalued acquirers subject to high 
market attention. This evidence suggests, as predicted, a post-acquisition correction in the valuation of the overvalued acquirers 
subject to low market attention. This relative wealth difference is significant at the 10% level. These results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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????????????????????????????? are regressed on both the market ?????? and sector returns ????????? in the 
window from 240 to 10 days before the day of the acquisition announcement (t). The assumption 
supporting this approach is that the higher the correlation between the ???????stock returns with the market 
and sector returns, the less likely it is that the prevailing stock price reflects new information collected by 
investors. The high Roll R2 has been used as proxy for low investor attention (i.e. low price 
informativeness) in previous studies such as Chen et al. (2007) and Bakke and Whited (2010). 
 
8.2. Multivariate evidence 
In Table 8 we present two regressions with the same specifications of Model (5) reported in Table 
5 and Model (2) reported in Table 7 with the only difference being that the proxy of low investor attention 
is the dummy variable ?High Roll R2? that is assigned the value of 1 i??????????????????????R2 exceeds its 
20th percentile, and 0 otherwise. The results hold if the 25th and 30th percentiles are used instead. 
Interestingly, more than 70% of the acquirers classified as subject to low investor attention are also 
classified as acquirers subject to high Roll R2. 
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
The results of both models are qualitatively similar to the ones reported in Sections 5 and 7. The 
evidence reported in Model (1) (Table 8) suggests that the overvalued stock-paying acquirers subject to 
high investor attention (i.e., low Roll R2) experience a significant reduction in their announcement period 
CAR (8 percentage points). Nevertheless, this initial wealth effect is neutralized in the group of deals 
announced by overvalued stock-paying acquirers subject to low investor attention (i.e., high Roll R2).10 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
notion that the overvalued stock-paying acquirers subject to limited investor attention experience a 
significant post-acquisitions correction in their valuations. More specifically, these acquirers experience 
38% decline in their post-announcement BHAR compared to the overvalued stock-paying acquirers 
which are subject to high investor attention. Overall, our analysis of the wealth effects of M&As using the 
Roll R2 as an alternative investor attention proxy provides the same qualitative conclusions as the analysis 
???????????????????????????-acquisition trading activity.11 
 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
10 The matching-based results using the high Roll R2 as a proxy for low investor attention are available from the authors upon 
request. 
11 In untabulated results, we have re-estimated the Logit model from Table 4 with the High values of Roll R2 as a proxy for low 
market attention. Our results, which are available from the authors upon request, suggest that overvalued acquirers are more 
likely to engage in stock-financed acquisitions relative undervalued acquirers (as classified within the low Roll R2). This 
difference is significant at the 10% level. 
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9. Conclusion 
A stylized finding in the corporate finance and M&A literature is that the acquirers using their own shares 
as the payment method in their takeovers involving listed-target firms tend to experience substantial 
reductions in their existing valuations. Such wealth ??????? ???? ??????????? ??? ???? ????????????? ???????????
interpretation of the use of stock-?????????? ??? ?? ??????? ????? ???? ?????????? ??????? shares are overvalued, 
which triggers an immediate ??????????? ??? ??????????? ?????? ??????????????? ??????s, which are robust to 
various model specifications and measures of investor attention, suggest that the acquirers whose stock 
prices are subject to low investor attention engage in overvaluation-driven stock-financed acquisitions 
without experiencing immediate shareholder wealth losses. The PSM analysis, which is accompanied 
with the Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis, further validates these results. 
Moreover, our analysis of the acquirer?? long-run abnormal returns suggests that the 
overvaluation of stock paying acquirers that receive limited investor attention is only corrected in the 
years following the acquisition announcement. Overall, our results highlight the role of investor attention 
as a moderator in the relationship between the payment method and the acquirer?? announcement period 
and post-announcement acquirer abnormal returns. These results also contribute to the literature 
suggesting that corporate managers aim to exploit the limited investor attention in timing their 
announcements (DeHaan et al., 2015; Michaely et al., 2016). 
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A??????????? ????????????????????s 
Variable Description Source 
Acquirer CAR (%) 
???? ??????????? ?-day (-2, 2) announcement periods cumulative 
abnormal returns. The abnormal return in each day is the difference 
????????????????????????????????????????-weighted returns of NYSE 
firms. 
Datastream + 
?????????
Estimations 
Acquirer BHAR12 (%) 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Datastream + 
?????????
Estimations 
Acquirer BHAR24 (%) 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
??????????????????????????????????????????????
Datastream + 
?????????
Estimations 
Acquirer Closely Held Shares (%)  
???????????????????????????????shares that are closely held by a small 
group of family or institutional investors. 
Datastream 
Acquirer High Closely Held Shares (%)  Dummy =1 if Acquirer Closely Held Share>10%, 0 otherwise. Datastream 
Acquirer Debt-to-Assets 
???? ??????????? ?????? ??? Debt-to-Assets 43 days prior to the bid 
announcement. 
Datastream 
Acquirer Market Value (m$)  
???? ??????????? ??????? ?????? ??? ??????? ??? ????? ?????? ??? ????
announcement, in millions of dollars. 
Datastream 
Acquirer Market to Book Value 
 
The market value of the acquirer 43 days before the acquisition, 
divided by its book value of equity from the most recent accounting 
statement prior to the bid announcement. 
Datastream 
Acquirer Market to Book Value 
 
The market value of the target 43 days before the acquisition, 
divided by its book value of equity from the most recent accounting 
statement prior to the bid announcement. 
Datastream 
Acquirer Standard Deviation (%) 
 
???? ?????????????????????? ???? ????????????????? ????????? ???????? ????
the 240 to 43 days that precede the bid announcement. 
Datastream 
Presence of Acquirer Toehold 
 
Dummy=1 if the acquirer already owns target shares (i.e. Acquirer 
Toehold>0), 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Cash 
Dummy=1 if the consideration is 100% financed with cash and 0 
otherwise. 
SDC 
Diversifying  
 
Dummy=1 if the acquirer and the target have different two-digit SIC 
codes, and 0 otherwise (FCSD). 
SDC 
Stock 
Dummy = 1 when the consideration is 100% financed with stocks 
and 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Target Market Value (m$) 
 
????????????????????? of equity 43 days prior to bid announcement, 
in millions of dollars. 
Datastream 
Target Standard Deviation (%)  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
240 to 43 days that precede the bid announcement. 
Datastream 
Propensity Score 
 
The propensity scores estimated via the Logit model to predict the 
presence of an acquirer with a low level of pre-acquisition trading in 
a stock financed deal. 
?????????
Estimations 
Low Trading 
??? ???? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??? ???? ??????????? daily 
percentage of traded shares relative to listed shares exceeds the 70th 
percentile of the corresponding sample in the period of 43 to 10 days 
preceding the acquisition, 0 otherwise (High Trading). In the 
matching analysis, this variable is defined as Dummy=1 if the 
??????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ????????? ??? ??????????????
exceeds the 50th percentile of the corresponding sample in the period 
of 43 to 10 days preceding the acquisition, 0 otherwise (High 
Trading). 
Datastream + 
?????????
Estimations 
Percentage of Acquirer Traded Shares 
(%) 
???? ??????????? ?????? ??????????? ??? ??????? ??????? ????????? ??? ???????
shares in the period of 43 to 10 days preceding the acquisition.  
Datastream 
Acquirer Overvaluation 
The acquiring firm-specific overvaluation estimated based on the 
Rhodes?Kropf et al. (2005) method of decomposing the market-to-
book value.  
Datastream + 
?????????
Estimations 
Overvalued Acquirer Dummy =1 if Acquirer Overvaluation >0, and 0 otherwise. Datastream 
 
Continued 
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Continued (Appendix 1) 
 
Variable Description Source 
Acquirer Roll R2 
The R2 ????? ???? ??????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ???????? ??? ????? ????
market and sector returns. The latter returns are defined by 
Datastream as the local sector returns.  
Datastream + 
?????????
Estimations 
Acquirer High Roll R2 Dummy=1, if the Roll R2 exceeds its 20th percentile, 0 otherwise. 
Datastream + 
?????????
Estimations 
Acquirer RoA (%) 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
announcement. 
Datastream 
Acquirer RoA12 (%) 
???? ??????????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ????????? ????? following the 
acquisition announcement. 
Datastream 
Acquirer RoA24 (%) 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the acquisition announcement. 
Datastream 
Friday Dummy =1 if the deal is announced on a Friday, 0 otherwise. SDC 
Industrials  
A macro-industry that includes the following mid-industries: 
Aerospace & Defense, Automobiles & Components, 
Building/Construction & Engineering, Industrial Conglomerates, 
Machinery, Transportation & Infrastructure and other industrials.  
SDC 
Healthcare 
A macro-industry that includes the following mid-industries: 
Biotechnology, Healthcare Equipment & Supplies, Providers & 
Services (HMOs), Hospitals, Pharmaceuticals, and Other Healthcare. 
SDC 
Consumer Staples 
A macro-industry that includes the following mid-industries: 
Agriculture & Livestock, Food and Beverage, Household & Personal 
Products, Textiles & Apparel, Tobacco, and Other Consumer Staples. 
SDC 
Materials 
A macro-industry that includes the following mid-industries: 
Chemicals 
Construction Materials, Containers & Packaging, Metals & Mining 
Paper & Forest Products, and Other Materials. 
SDC 
Media and Entertainment 
A macro-industry that includes the following mid-industries: 
Advertising & Marketing, Broadcasting, Cable, Casinos & Gaming, 
Hotels and Lodging, and Motion Pictures / Audio Visual. 
SDC 
Retail 
A macro-industry that includes the following mid-industries: Apparel 
Retailing, Automotive Retailing, Computers & Electronics Retailing 
Discount and Department Store Retailing, Food & Beverage Retailing, Home 
Improvement Retailing, Internet and Catalog Retailing, and Other Retailing. 
SDC 
Consumer Products and Services 
A macro-industry that includes the following mid-industries: Educational 
Services, Employment Services, Home Furnishings, Legal Services, 
Professional Services, Travel Services, and Other Consumer Products. 
SDC 
High Technology 
A macro-industry that includes the following mid-industries: Computers & 
Peripherals, E-commerce / B2B, Electronics, Hardware, Internet 
Infrastructure, Internet Software & Services, Semi-Conductors, and Software. 
SDC 
Energy and Power 
A macro-industry that includes the following mid-industries: Alternative 
Energy Sources, Oil & Gas, Petrochemicals, Pipelines, Power, Water and 
Waste Management, and Other Energy and Power. 
SDC 
Telecommunications 
A macro-industry that includes the following mid-industries: Space and 
Satellites, Telecommunications Equipment, Telecommunications Services, 
Wireless, and Other Telecom. 
SDC 
Financials 
A macro-industry that includes the following mid-industries: Asset 
Management, Banks, Brokerage, Credit Institutions, Diversified Financials, 
Government Sponsored Enterprises, Insurance, and Other Financials. 
SDC 
Real Estate 
A macro-industry that includes the following mid-industries: Non 
Residential, Real Estate Management & Development, Residential, and Other 
Real Estate. 
SDC 
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Table 1: Annual distribution of the sampled deals 
  Panel A Panel B 
Year All Cash Stock Focused Diversifying IND HCR CST MAT MED RTL CPS HT EPW TLC FIN RST 
2002 21 15 6 14 7 0 7 1 1 1 0 1 6 0 0 4 0 
2003 21 13 8 11 10 1 3 0 0 1 0 1 3 1 2 8 1 
2004 30 16 14 21 9 0 8 0 0 0 0 2 8 2 0 10 0 
2005 30 19 11 13 17 1 9 0 1 0 0 2 10 0 1 6 0 
2006 50 35 15 26 24 0 6 1 2 3 1 1 22 1 2 9 2 
2007 68 53 15 39 29 4 12 1 3 5 2 4 19 0 4 13 1 
2008 38 28 10 25 13 2 7 0 0 0 2 0 16 2 1 8 0 
2009 38 17 21 25 13 1 5 3 1 0 0 2 13 5 2 5 1 
2010 57 45 12 39 18 5 9 1 1 0 0 2 25 2 2 10 0 
2011 37 23 14 28 9 3 6  5 0 0 0 3 4 3 9 4 
2012 34 22 12 22 12 2 3 1 0 0 1 3 7 2 3 12 0 
2013 45 27 18 36 9 2 6 2 0 1 2 3 7 4 1 15 2 
2014 44 25 19 30 14 1 8 3 3 3 1 3 6 3 3 8 2 
N 513 338 175 329 184 22 89 13 17 14 9 24 145 26 24 117 13 
% 100 65.89 34.11 64.13 35.87 4.29 17.35 2.53 3.31 2.73 1.75 4.68 28.27 5.07 4.68 22.81 2.53 
 
Note: Panel A represents the annual distribution of public-to-public M&A bids announced by U.S acquirers between January 1st, 2002 and 
December 31st, 2014. The distribution of the sample is presented according to the total number of transactions, method of payment (Cash or 
Stock), and whether the acquisition is industry-focused or diversifying. Panel B represents the yearly distribution of the M&A bids with respect to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????ials (MAT), Media 
and Entertainment (MED), Retail (RTL), Consumer Products (CPS), High-Technology (HT), Energy and Power (EPW), Telecommunications 
(TLC), Financials (FIN) and Real Estate (RST). N is the number of deals in each category and (%) is the percentage of deals in this category 
relative to the total number of deals (513). Appendix 1 provides a detailed description of these sectors. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Median Max Min SD 
Acquirer CAR (%)  513 0.23 0.037 70.54 -30.57 7.84 
Acquirer BHAR12 (%) 393 -6.33 -6.10 124.00 -102.00 33.99 
Acquirer BHAR24 (%) 393 -9.19 -9.92 134.05 -123.00 41.67 
Target Market Value (m$) 513 1074.49 231.09 53535.09 2.38 3761.39 
Acquirer Toehold (%) 513 2.56 0.00 88.00 0.00 11.96 
Acquirer Market Value (m$) 513 26893.63 3966.59 525775.70 3.69 52412.71 
Acquirer Market to Book Value  513 3.01 1.89 26.00 0.27 3.66 
Target Market to Book Value  513 2.83 2.23 13.04 0.31 2.21 
Acquirer Closely Held Shares (%) 513 26.12 0.00 100 0.00 0.44 
Target Standard Deviation (%)  513 3.30 2.76 22.01 0.00 2.24 
Acquirer Standard Deviation (%)  513 2.24 1.79 23.47 0.64 1.74 
Acquirer Debt-to-Assets (%) 513 20.76 18.69 78.80 0.00 16.09 
Acquirer Overvaluation 513 -0.03 -0.05 1.17 -1.14 0.65 
Percentage of Acquirer Traded Shares (%) 513 0.97 0.63 14.74 0.00 1.38 
 Acquirer Roll R2 513 0.30 0.30 0.76 0.01 0.18 
Acquirer ROA (%) 513 4.16 5.01 77.50 -100 12.17 
Acquirer ROA12 (%) 393 3.23 4.00 61.75 -98.54 12.56 
Acquirer ROA24 (%) 393 7.13 9.67 102.08 -99.04 26.87 
 
Note: This table represents descriptive statistics for the continuous covariates in the sample. For each 
variable, the number of available observations, mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard 
deviation values are reported. The market-to-book values, acquirer overvaluation, and BHAR variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In estimating the post-acquisition BHAR and RoA, deals by 
acquirers who made more than other acquisitions during the month before the acquisition, the month of 
the acquisition, and the month after the acquisition are excluded to ensure that the long-term effects are 
not conflated. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. 
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Table 3: Univariate results 
 
 Deal Groups Acquirer CAR Acquirer BHAR12 Acquirer BHAR24 
(a) Stock Financed Deals (Stock=1) -0.54 (N=175)  -8.27*** (N=143) -10.60*** (N=143) 
(b) Cash Financed Deals (Cash=1) 0.64** (N=338)  -5.22*** (N=250) -8.38*** (N=250) 
(c) (a)-(b) -1.18* -3.05 -2.22 
(d) 
Stock-financed deals with low trading of 
???????????????????????????????????????
Trading=1) 
0.09 (N=135) -8.50*** (N=114)  -12.66*** (N=114) 
(e) 
Stock-financed deals with high trading of 
????????????????????????????????????
Trading=0) 
-3.19** (N=40)   -7.40 (N=29) -0.2.49(N=29) 
 (d)-(e) 3.28** -1.10 -10.17 
(f) (d)-(b) -0.55 -3.28 -4.28 
 (e)-(b) -3.18** -2.18 5.89 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to the 12- and 24-month Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHAR) across various groups of deals based on the 
method of payment used and the ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is estimated based on the level of daily trading volume relative to listed shares in the period of 43 to 10 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????subject to high (low) market 
attention if the level of its share turnover is above (below) the 70th percentile in the original sample. The 
univariate analysis is reported for the overall groups of stock and cash financed deals, stock financed 
deals with acquirers subject to high and low market pre-acquisition trading in addition to cash financed 
deals. N indicates the number of observations. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. 
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Table 4: Predicting the choice of the payment method 
 
Dependent Variable 
Stock = 1 
Cash = 0 
Stock = 1 
Cash = 0 
Explanatory Variable\Model (.) (1) (2) 
Intercept 1.666** 
(0.691) 
2.3105*** 
(0.777) 
Overvalued Acquirer -0.270 
(0.403) 
-0.232 
(0.434) 
Overvalued Acquirer × Low Trading 0.951** 
(0.412) 
0.882** 
(0.439) 
Percentage of Acquirer Traded Shares -0.007 
(0.105) 
-0.004 
(0.103) 
Acquirer Market to Book Value -0.048 
(0.039) 
-0.054 
(0.041) 
Target Market to Book Value -0.118* 
(0.069) 
-0.100 
(0.072) 
Diversifying -0.572** 
(0.254) 
-0.634** 
(0.274) 
ln(Target Market Value) 0.582*** 
(0.108) 
0.617*** 
(0.116) 
ln(Acquirer Market Value) -0.635*** 
(0.100) 
-0.714*** 
(0.111) 
 Presence of Acquirer Toehold 0.825* 
(0.494) 
0.133 
(0.544) 
Acquirer High Closely Held Shares -0.749*** 
(0.280) 
-0.931*** 
(0.309) 
Target Standard Deviation 0.006 
(0.083) 
0.026 
(0.087) 
Acquirer Standard Deviation 0.166 
(0.127) 
0.177 
(0.141) 
Acquirer Debt-to-Assets -0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
Friday 0.350 
(0.303) 
0.476 
(0.320) 
Acquirer RoA -0.0404*** 
(0.013) 
-0.039*** 
(0.015) 
Year Effects NO YES 
Industry Effects NO YES 
N 513 513 
Mc-Fadden R-Squared 0.27 0.32 
 
Note: This table presents the outcome of two Logit models that predict the listing status of the acquiring firm based on target-
specific and market-related factors. Model (1) excludes year and industry effects while Model (2) controls for these effects. N 
indicates the number of observations. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Please 
refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. 
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????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
Dependent Variable Acquirer CAR Acquirer CAR Acquirer CAR Acquirer CAR Acquirer CAR 
Explanatory Variable\Model (.) (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  
Intercept 
0.379 
(0.478) 
1.281** 
(0.624) 
-0.337 
(3.131) 
-2.116 
(1.511) 
0.119 
(3.151) 
Stock 
-4.413*** 
(1.684) 
-4.510*** 
(1.653) 
-6.002*** 
(1.842) 
-1.206 
(1.447) 
-1.679 
(1.227) 
Stock × Low Trading 
4.168** 
(1.881) 
4.076** 
(1.838) 
4.550** 
(1.938) 
  
Stock × Overvalued Acquirer   
 -6.169** 
(2.771) 
-6.420** 
(2.876) 
Stock × Overvalued Acquirer × Low Trading   
 5.603** 
(2.533) 
6.073** 
(2.689) 
Percentage of Acquirer Traded Shares 
0.249 
(0.312) 
0.281 
(0.320) 
0.269 
(0.300) 
0.274 
(0.296) 
0.244 
(0.329) 
Overvalued Acquirer  
-1.819** 
(0.639) 
-0.257 
(0.691) 
-0.810 
(0.677) 
0.267 
(0.787) 
Acquirer Market to Book Value   
-0.083 
(0.117) 
 -0.078 
(0.117) 
Target Market to Book Value   
-0.218* 
(0.130) 
 -0.207* 
(0.127) 
Diversifying   
-0.481 
(0.663) 
 -0.436 
(0.677) 
ln(Target Market Value)   
-0.050 
(0.300) 
 -0.040 
(0.295) 
ln(Acquirer Market Value)   
-0.303 
(0.290) 
 -0.361 
(0.290) 
 Presence of Acquirer Toehold   
-0.661 
(1.691) 
 -0.348 
(1.686) 
Acquirer High Closely Held Shares   
-0.182 
(0.944) 
 -0.269 
(0.948) 
Target Standard Deviation   
-0.265 
(0.273) 
 -0.286 
(0.270) 
Acquirer Standard Deviation   
1.136*** 
(0.454) 
 1.109*** 
(0.441) 
Acquirer Debt-to-Assets   
0.033 
(0.028) 
 0.034 
(0.028) 
Friday   
-0.692 
(0.824) 
 -0.769 
(0.804) 
Acquirer ROA   
0.104 
(0.068) 
 0.102 
(0.070) 
Year Effects NO NO YES YES YES 
Industry Effects NO NO YES YES YES 
N 513 513 513 513 513 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.10 
 
Note: This table reports the results of the cross-sectional analysis explaining the 5-day announcement 
period acquirer CAR. The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. N indicates the number of 
observations. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Please 
refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. 
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?
Table 6: PSM results 
 
Panel A : Logit model 
Intercept 
Overvalued 
Acquirer 
Acquirer Standard 
Deviation 
Target Standard 
Deviation 
ln(Target Market 
Value) 
ln(Acquirer 
Market Value) 
4.095*** 
(1.043) 
0.902** 
(0.437) 
0.003 
(0.100) 
-0.140 
(0.099) 
-0.385** 
(0.159) 
-0.191 
(0.154) 
 
Panel B : M atching outcome 
Matching Algorithm Caliper Matching 
Caliper 0.1 
Matched Observations per Treated Deal 4:1 
Number of Treated Observations 24 
Number of Control Observations with Replacement 96 
??? (%) (Abadie and Imbens (2006)  
Standard Errors) 
3.526*** 
(0.647) 
Cut-???????????????????? 1.47 
Cut-???????????????????? 1.59 
 
Panel C : Regression diagnostics 
Dependent Variable Acquirer CAR 
Intercept 
1.128 
(12.456) 
Overvalued Acquirer 
-11.509** 
(5.527) 
Overvalued Acquirer × Low Trading 
12.369*** 
(4.620) 
 
Panel D: ????????????????????? 
Before Matching After Matching 
 
Treatment  
Group 
Control  
Group 
p-value Treatment  
Group 
Control  
Group 
p-value 
Propensity Score 0.66 0.51 0.00 0.66 0.66 0.16 
ln(Acquirer Market Value) 6.85 7.95 0.00 7.64 7.90 0.62 
ln(Target Market Value) 5.15 6.55 0.00 6.71 6.51 0.57 
Acquirer Market to Book Value 2.60 3.44 0.32 2.27 3.47 0.13 
Target Market to Book Value 1.84 2.85 0.03 1.95 2.68 0.10 
Diversifying 0.25 0.17 0.27 0.29 0.18 0.25 
Acquirer Standard Deviation 2.85 3.04 0.59 2.93 3.08 0.71 
Target Standard Deviation 3.38 3.71 0.36 3.21 3.73 0.45 
Acquirer Debt-to-Assets 20.38 18.37 0.49 20.50 18.85 0.68 
Acquirer High Closely Held Shares 0.27 0.26 0.90 0.29 0.26 0.76 
 Presence of Acquirer Toehold 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.18 
Acquirer Overvaluation -0.20 0.06 0.14 -0.05 -0.08 0.46 
 
Note: This table reports the outcome of the Propensity Score Matching analysis that estimates the wealth effect of the presence of 
an acquirer whose shares are subject to low trading activity on the sample of stock financed acquisitions. The outcome variable is 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of daily traded to listed shares is below the 50th percentile in the sample. The propensity scores are estimated via a Logit model 
where the dependent variable is Low Trading. Variables are included in this Logit model provided that such an inclusion 
improves the balance of the key covariates in the matched sample. Panel A reports the Logit model used to estimate the 
propensity scores. Panel B reports the outcome of the matching analysis. More specifically, this panel reports the caliper used in 
the matching, the ratio of matched observations to each treated observation, the number of treated and control observations in the 
matched sample, the estimated ATT with the Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard errors and the cut-off ??????????? ???????????
10% level of significance. These outcomes are reported based on the Caliper Matching algorithm with a caliper of 0.1. Four 
untreated deals (i.e., High Trading) are matched to each treated deal (i.e., Low Trading) while allowing each untreated deal to be 
used as a match more than once. Overall, 36 observations are dropped from the analysis in the matched sample. Panel C presents 
the outcome of the regression analysi????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
balancing the propensity scores and the key empirical variables. The mean value of each of these variables in the treated group 
and the control group and the bootstrapped p-value from the t-test of the null hypothesis that the difference is statistically equal to 
0 are reported before and after the matching. ***,**, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and the 10% levels respectively. 
Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. 
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????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????-acquisition performance 
 
Dependent Variable BHAR12 BHAR24 Acquirer RoA12 Acquirer RoA24 
Explanatory Variable\Model (.) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -11.150 
(12.660) 
-15.502 
(14.427) 
5.975 
(4.779) 
4.389 
(8.147) 
Stock -9.257 
(5.805) 
-6.959 
(6.822) 
-0.429 
(1.252) 
1.610 
(3.350) 
Stock × Overvalued Acquirer 19.806** 
(9.241) 
34.788*** 
(11.467) 
-4.240 
(6.059) 
-0.781 
(9.338) 
Stock × Overvalued Acquirer × Low Trading -15.099* 
(8.551) 
-28.909*** 
(11.018) 
0.934 
(6.784) 
-2.789 
(9.938) 
Percentage of Acquirer Traded Shares -1.389 
(0.945) 
-1.690 
(1.227) 
0.981** 
(0.509) 
1.194 
(0.899) 
Overvalued Acquirer -1.563 
(4.801) 
-2.376 
(5.579) 
0.338 
(1.340) 
1.4690 
(3.033) 
Acquirer Market to Book Value -0.337 
(0.378) 
0.375 
(0.543) 
0.144 
(0.321) 
-0.477 
(0.570) 
Target Market to Book Value -1.737*** 
(0.632) 
-1.709** 
(0.716) 
0.551** 
(0.283) 
3.711 
(0.689) 
Diversifying -1.009 
(3.803) 
1.299 
(4.388) 
0.506 
(1.239) 
0.341 
(2.600) 
ln(Target Market Value) 0.228 
(1.540) 
-0.419 
(1.831) 
-0.633 
(0.422) 
-2.520*** 
(0.960) 
ln(Acquirer Market Value) 0.186 
(1.202) 
0.957 
(1.379) 
0.590 
(0.448) 
2.087** 
(0.918) 
 Presence of Acquirer Toehold 4.564 
(7.151) 
5.509 
(8.619) 
0.259* 
(0.154) 
0.374 
(0.232) 
Acquirer High Closely Held Shares -4.134 
(4.850) 
-0.935 
(5.713) 
-1.229 
(1.325) 
-1.594 
(2.893) 
Target Standard Deviation 1.118 
(0.939) 
0.461 
(1.087) 
-0.282 
(0.538) 
-1.511** 
(0.654) 
Acquirer Standard Deviation -0.043 
(0.872) 
1.021 
(0.964) 
-2.844*** 
(0.912) 
-4.488*** 
(1.194) 
Acquirer Debt-to-Assets -0.084 
(0.115) 
-0.008 
(0.147) 
0.031 
(0.043) 
0.080 
(1.123) 
Friday 5.378 
(4.502) 
2.507 
(5.027) 
0.004 
(1.472) 
-0.778 
(3.681) 
Acquirer ROA -0.088 
(0.204) 
0.072 
(0.203) 
0.259* 
(0.154) 
0.374 
(0.232) 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES 
N 393 393 393 393 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.08 0.01 0.36 0.36 
 
Note: This table reports the results of the cross-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
post-acquisition buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and post-acquisition Returns on Assets. The 
dependent variable in Model (1) is the 12-month BHAR. In turn, the dependent variable in Model (1) is 
the 24-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
during the 12 and 24 months after the acquisition, respectively. The standard errors reported in 
parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors. N indicates the number of observations. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. 
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????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????- and long-?????????????????????????R2 as a measure of 
low market scrutiny 
 
Dependent Variable Acquirer CAR BHAR24 
Explanatory Variable\Model (.) (1)  (2)  
Intercept 1.285 
(2.831) 
-3.207 
(16.940) 
Stock -2.081 
(1.354) 
-6.113 
(7.665) 
Stock × Overvalued Acquirer -7.242*** 
(2.947) 
44.816*** 
(17.199) 
Stock × Overvalued Acquirer × Acquirer High Roll R2 6.204** 
(2.745) 
-37.660** 
(17.292) 
 Acquirer Roll R2 -5.632** 
(2.433) 
14.483 
(16.060) 
Overvalued Acquirer -0.018 
(0.798) 
-2.960 
(6.050) 
Acquirer Market to Book Value -0.057 
(0.124) 
0.186 
(0.558) 
Target Market to Book Value -0.193 
(0.129) 
-1.705** 
(0.746) 
Diversifying -0.133 
(0.701) 
0.948 
(4.812) 
ln(Target Market Value) -0.053 
(0.306) 
-0.308 
(1.809) 
ln(Acquirer Market Value) -0.174 
(0.298) 
0.0323 
(1.667) 
 Presence of Acquirer Toehold -0.907 
(1.701) 
10.292 
(9.582) 
Acquirer High Closely Held Shares -0.310 
(0.921) 
-1.994 
(5.522) 
Target Standard Deviation -0.262 
(0.264) 
-0.232 
(1.230) 
Acquirer Standard Deviation 1.096*** 
(0.432) 
0.289 
(1.223) 
Acquirer Debt-to-Assets 0.042 
(0.029) 
-0.143 
(0.154) 
Friday -0.726 
(0.820) 
1.400 
(4.917) 
Acquirer ROA 0.102 
(0.066) 
-0.028 
(0.238) 
Year Effects YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES 
N 513 393 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.10 0.02 
 
Note: This table reports the results of the cross-sectional analysis explaining the 5-day announcement 
period acquirer CAR (Model 1) and 24-month BHAR (Model 2) with the high acquirer Roll R2 used as a 
proxy of low market scrutiny. The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. N indicates the 
number of observations. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. 
?
 
